PUBLIC ACCESS TO CABLE TELEVISION AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
I. INTRODUCTION

Cable television' has changed greatly since its inception in 1950.
Initially, "community antenna television" (CATV)2 was established
to service subscribers who were beyond the range of conventional
broadcast signals.' Today, in addition to retransmitting broadcast
signals, cable operators transmit cable network programming and, in
many instances, originate their own local programming.4 A number
of cable operators presently provide public access channels, which
are made available for public use on a first come, first serve, nondiscriminatory basis.'
In 1976, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
promulgated rules mandating the establishment of public access
channels by cable operators.6 Three years later, the United States
Supreme Court, in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video IJ),7
dealt a severe blow to the public's right of access to cable by ruling
that the FCC did not have the jurisdiction to adopt those requireI "Cable television" refers to a system that transmits electrical signals to television
sets through wire rather than through the air. M.
ON MASS MEDIA LAW

FRANKLIN, CASES AND MATERIALS

630 (2d ed. 1982).

2 "Community antenna television" and "CATV" are terms used to describe a system that receives and retransmits television broadcast signals. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 161 (1968). The term "cable television" is now more
frequently used because most cable systems offer a wider variety of services. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 144 n.9 (1972).
3 M. HAMBURG, ALL ABOUT CABLE § 1.02 (1981); see Fortnightly Corp. v. United
Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1968) (describing function of cable television in 1960's); United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 161-63 (1968)
(same).
4 STORER COMMUNICATIONS,
BROADCASTING/CABLECASTING
YEARBOOK D-1
(1983).
5 See id Several states presently mandate public access to cable television. See, e.g.,
CONN.GEN. STAT. § 16-333(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 238.05(b)
(West Cum. Supp. 1984); Rules Governing Community Antenna Television Systems,
Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission, Division of Public Utilities and Carriers, ch.
14 (Jan. 14, 1983) (updating original rules issued Jan. 30, 1981) [hereinafter cited as R.I.
Rules]. California permits cable companies that meet certain requirements to regulate
their own rates. One such requirement is that the company provide a public access
program. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53066.1(a)(4)-() (West Cum. Supp. 1984). Cable companies may also be subject to mandatory access requirements pursuant to local ordinances and franchising agreements. See M. HAMBURG, supra note 3, at § 6.04[3].
6 See Cable TV Capacity and Access Requirements, 59 F.C.C.2d 294, 294-97 (1976);
see also infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
7 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
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ments.' The Court, however, did not address the first amendment 9
argument advanced by cable operators-that the FCC requirements
functionally deprived them of editorial discretion over some of their
channels-except to note that the issue was "not frivolous.' ' 0 Since
the Midwest Vdeo II decision, several states have adopted their own
access rules." A recent constitutional challenge' 2 to Rhode Island's
access regulations13 illustrates the need for the Supreme Court to resolve the first amendment issue.
The difficulty in defining the first amendment rights of cable
operators arises in part from the fact that cable resembles broadcast' 4
The Supreme
television in some ways and newspapers in others.'
from the
differently
media
print
the
treated
has
historically
Court
broadcast media with respect to first amendment protection.' 6 While
the Court has interpreted the first amendment as prohibiting government interference with the exercise of editorial control over the print
media,' 7 this broad protection has not been extended to
broadcasters. '
Courts and commentators grappling with the question of defining the first amendment rights of cable television operators have attempted to resolve the issue first by analogizing the cable medium
either to newspapers or broadcast television and then by applying
at 708; see in/fa notes 117-18 & 120-21 and accompanying text.
9 The first amendment, in pertinent part, provides that "Congress shall make no law
" U.S. CONST. amend. I. The
. . .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ..
Supreme Court has held that the first amendment is applicable to state action. See, e.g.,
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 500 (1952).
10 Midwest Video I, 440 U.S. at 709 n.19.
'' See supra note 5. For further discussion of various state cable access regulations, see
Harrison, Access and Pay Cable Rates: Off-Linits to Regulators After Midwest Video II, 16
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 591, 619-30 (1981).
12 See Berkshire Cablevision, Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1983); see also
i /a notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
13 See R.I. Rules, supra note 5; see also in/a notes 123 & 124 and accompanying text.
14 The term "broadcast" describes the wireless transmission of electrical signals to
television sets and radios. See Meyerson, The FirstAmendment and the Cable Television Operator: An Unprotective Shield Against Publhc Access Requirements, 4 CoMM/ENT 1, 3 (1981).
8 Id

15 See B. SCHMIDT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS VS. PUBLIC ACCESS 199-216 (1976)

(comparing cable television to print media and broadcast media); Miller & Beals, Regulating Cable Television, 57 WASH. L. REV. 85, 117-18 (1981) (same).
16 See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
17 See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). However, editorial judgment may be restricted by libel laws and statutes prohibiting the publishing
of obscenities. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel laws
apply to publishers); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity not protected
by first amendment).
18 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) ("of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment protection").
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the suitable constitutional model. 9 The Eighth and District of Columbia Circuits, for example, have determined that cable television
systems are protected by the first amendment to the same extent as
newspapers, thus leading to the conclusion that governmental entities may not infringe upon the cable operator's right to control the
editorial content of his programming.2" In contrast, a Federal district court in Rhode Island has recently reasoned that the characteristics of cable and newspapers differ significantly, thus justifying the
imposition of mandatory public access requirements on cable
operators. 2'
This Comment will discuss the different first amendment treatment accorded to newspapers and broadcasters by the Supreme
Court as well as the evolving case law concerning the first amendment rights of cable operators. Emphasis will be placed on the effect
of mandatory public access regulations on the first amendment interests of cable operators. Finally, this Comment will suggest that cable
television is a unique medium that requires its own constitutional
standard. 2
II. PRINT VERSUS BROADCAST: DISTINCT MEDIA WITH
DIFFERENT FIRST AMENDMENT STANDARDS

A. Broadcast Media
Government regulation of broadcast radio stations began in
1927 with the creation of the Federal Radio Commission (FRC). 3
19 See Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978) (analogizing cable
television to newspapers), affd, 440 U.S. 689 (1979); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567
F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (same), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); Goldberg, Ross
& Spector, Cable Television, Government Regulation, and the First Amendment, 3 COMM/ENT
577 (1981) (same); Barrow, Program Regulation in Cable TV Fostering Debate in a Cohesive
Audience, 61 VA. L. REV. 515 (1975) (analogizing cable television to broadcast media).
20 Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1055-56 (8th Cir. 1978) (print media

constitutional standard applied to cable), aJf'd, 440 U.S. 689 (1979); Home Box Office,
Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 46 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (same), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829
(1977).
21 Berkshire Cablevision, Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976,.985 (D.R.I. 1983).
22 The Supreme Court has stated that "[e]ach method of communicating ideas is 'a
law unto itself' and that law must reflect the 'differing natures, values, abuses and dangers' of each method." Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981)
(quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
23 Federal Radio Commission Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed
1934). Federal regulation of radio emerged in 1910 with the Wireless Ship Act, which
prohibited steamers carrying or licensed to carry fifty or more persons from leaving an
American port without efficient radio communication apparatus. Wireless Ship Act, ch.
379, 36 Stat. 629 (1910). The Secretary of Commerce and Labor was empowered to
enforce that legislation. d
General regulation of radio communication came into existence with the enactment

1984]

COMMENT

In 1934, Congress enacted the Communications Act 2 4 and estab-

lished the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to replace
the FRC.25 The purpose of the Act was "to make available . . . to
all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nationwide, and
world-wide wire and radio communication service."2 6 The FCC was
given authority to regulate broadcast service through the issuance of
renewable licenses to 2broadcasters
serving the "public convenience,
7
interest, or necessity.

The power of the FCC to issue licenses was first challenged in
the landmark case of NBC v. Un'ted Sates.28 Rejecting an argument
by chain broadcasters 29 that the mandatory licensing requirements
abridged their first amendment right of free speech, the Supreme
Court held that the scarcity of radio frequencies necessitated government regulation. 30 Writing for the majority, Justice Frankfurter explained that the radio spectrum was not large enough to
accommodate all who wished to use it and that the number of radio
stations which could operate without interfering with one another
was limited. 3 ' Therefore, in the Court's view, the licensing scheme
of the Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302. That statute barred the operation of
radio apparatus without a license issued by the Secretary of Commerce and Labor. Id.
For a review of the early history of government regulation of broadcasting in the United
States, see NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-17 (1943). See generally 1 E.
BARNOUW, A TOWER

IN BABEL:

A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING

IN THE UNITED

STATES (1966).
24 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151610 (1982)).
25 The FCC is composed of seven members appointed by the President, with the
consent of the Senate, for terms of seven years. 47 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
26 Id § 151.
27 See id. § 307(a). The Supreme Court has referred to the "public convenience, interest, or necessity" standard as "a supple instrument for the exercise of discretion by the
expert body which Congress has charged to carry out its legislative policy." FCC v.
Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940). The vagueness of this standard,
however, has led one commentator to charge that " '[p]ublic interest, convenience or
necessity' means about as little as any phrase that the drafters of the Act could have used
and still comply with the constitutional requirement that there be some standard to
guide the administrative wisdom of the licensing authority." Caldwell, The Standard of
Public Interest, Convenience or Necessity as Used in the Rado Act of 1927, 1 AIR L. REV. 295,
296 (1930).
Over the years the FCC has developed guidelines to enable broadcasters to meet the
standard. See generally, Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation,
60 TEx. L. REV. 207, 213-17 (1982) (describing FCC's approach to "public interest"
standard).
28 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
29 "Chain broadcasting" is defined as the "simultaneous broadcasting of an identical
program by two or more connected stations." 47 U.S.C. § 153(p) (1982).
30 NBC, 319 U.S. at 227.
31 Id at 213. For a more detailed discussion of the radio spectrum, see M. FRANKLIN,
supra note 1, at 611-16.
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was essential to the avoidance of confusion on the airwaves.3 2
Justice Frankfurter's scarcity rationale became the basis for limiting broadcasters' first amendment protection in subsequent decisions." In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,34 the Court employed
that rationale in upholding the FCC's rules embodied in the "fairness
doctrine," a principle that requires licensees both to broadcast issues
of public interest and to give fair coverage to each side of those issues.3 5 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice White recognized
that broadcasters have a first amendment interest in their editorial
control, but he maintained that the unique characteristics of broadcasting justified the application of a different first amendment standard.36 The Court observed that "it is idle to posit an unabridgeable
First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every
individual to speak, write, or publish" due to the scarcity of frequencies.3 7 Noting that the first amendment is predicated upon the principle that the "truth will ultimately prevail" in an "uninhibited
marketplace of ideas,"' 38 the Red Lion Court asserted that the fairness
doctrine compensated for the unavailability of the broadcasting medium to all who wished to use it. 39 Justice White compared the first
NBC, 319 U.S. at 226.
See CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 394-97 (1981); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94, 101-02 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390-92
(1969). The scarcity of broadcast frequencies is created by government regulation of the
electromagnetic spectrum and is not the result of any physical principles. See M.
FRANKLIN, supra note 1, at 615. Additional channels can be added by reducing the
bandwidth of each channel. Fowler & Brenner, supra note 27, at 222; see Bazelon, FCC
Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213, 223 (scarcity of frequencies
may no longer exist due to development of UHF band and cable television).
34 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
35 Id at 369. The fairness doctrine is contained in the Communications Act of 1934,
and was developed pursuant to the FCC's authority to regulate the broadcasting industry in the "public interest, convenience, or necessity." Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 379. The
general fairness doctrine comprises two specific components: the equal time provisions
and the personal attack rules. See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976) (equal time rules); 47
C.F.R. § 73.1920 (1983) (personal attack regulations). The equal time rule requires a
broadcaster who endorses a legally qualified political candidate to provide free reply
time to other such candidates. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976). A "legally qualified candidate" is one who meets the specific eligibility requirements delineated in 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.1940 (1983). The personal attack rules require a broadcaster who assaults the integrity, character, or honesty of an individual during the presentation of a controversial
issue to offer that person a reasonable opportunity to reply. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920 (1983).
For a further discussion of the fairness doctrine and its component parts, see Red Lion,
395 U.S. at 375-86; Straus Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1001, 1007 & n.1I
(D.C. Cir. 1976); and Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
36 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386.
37 Id at 388-89.
38 Id at 390.
39 Id at 391.
32

33
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amendment rights of broadcasters with those of the public and determined that "[iut is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right
of the broadcasters, which is paramount."'
Thus, under Red Lton,
the licensed broadcaster became a "public trustee" for the viewing
and listening public, with an obligation to present views that would
otherwise be barred from the airwaves due to the scarcity of broadcast frequencies.4
Although the extent of the public's right of access to the broadcast media was not clarified in Red Lton, the issue subsequently was
brought into sharp focus in CBS v. Democratic National Commiltee.4 2 In
that case, the Democratic National Committee and the Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace sought to establish the existence of
a constitutional right to purchase air time in order to present their
views on controversial issues. 43 The Court declined to recognize this
right," and held that a broadcaster's policy of refusing to accept paid
editorial advertisements did not violate the first amendment. 45
Chief Justice Burger, who authored the majority opinion, reaffirmed Red Lion's emphasis on the paramount rights of the viewing
and listening public. 46 He maintained, however, that a right of access through paid editorials would not serve the public interest because the available air time would be purchased predominantly by
40
41

Id at 390.
Id at 389. The Court noted that
[t]here is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Government
from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct
himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and
voices which are representative of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.

Id
42 412 U.S. 94 (1973). Following the Red Lion decision, several commentators suggested that a constitutional right of individual access to the airwaves existed. See, e.g.,
Marks, Broadcasting and Censorship: Frst Amendment Theory After Red Lion, 38 GEo. WASH.

L. REV. 974 (1970); Note, Violation of Fist Amendment for Radio and Television Stations to
Deny Completely Broadcasting Time to Editorial Advertisers When Time is Sold to Commercial
Advertisers, 85 HARV. L. REV. 689 (1972).
43 CBS, 412 U.S. at 97-98.
44 See id at 11. The Court maintained that as a public trustee, the broadcaster must

be allowed editorial discretion in complying with its fairness doctrine duties. Id
45 CBS, 412 U.S. at 121.
46 Id at 101-02. Chief Justice Burger specifically stated that
[b]ecause the broadcast media utilize a valuable and limited public resource,
there is also present an unusual order of First Amendment values ....
Al-

though the broadcaster is not without protection under the First Amendment, "[i]t
is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters, which is paramount. .. "

Id.(citation omitted) (quoting Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390).
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the affluent, thus presenting the public with limited views.4 7 The
Chief Justice further observed that applying the fairness doctrine
would be to no avail since the issues discussed on the air would continue to be determined by those wealthy enough to afford the initial
editorials.4" The Court did suggest that, at a point in the future, a
limited right of access to the broadcast media might be devised.49
Thus, although the CBS decision foreclosed a right of unlimited access to the electronic media, it clearly did not preclude the possibility
of a limited access right at a future date.
In 1981, the Supreme Court, in CBSv. FCC, recognized a limited right of access to the airwaves for legally qualified candidates for
Federal office. Congress had enacted a statute which authorized the
FCC to revoke the license of any broadcaster that refused legally
qualified candidates the right to purchase air time.5 Rejecting the
television networks' contention that their first amendment rights
were violated by the statute, Chief Justice Burger determined that
the statute "properly balances the First Amendment rights of federal
candidates, the public, and broadcasters."5 2 The Court emphasized
that it was not sanctioning a general right of access to the broadcast
media, but it observed that according a limited access right to Federal candidates enhanced freedom of expression by expanding the
ability of the public to receive information necessary "for the effec53
tive operation of the democratic process."

B. Newspapers
In 1974, the Supreme Court, in Mami Herald Publishhng Co. v.
Tornillo,5 4 refused either to allow a governmentally guaranteed right
of access 55 or to extend the fairness doctrine to newspapers. Tom'llo
involved a Florida right of reply statute which was very similar in
47 Id at 123. The Court observed that even on a first come, first serve basis, the views
of the affluent could virtually monopolize the airwaves because they could purchase
time more frequently. Id
48 Id
49 Id at 131. Chief Justice Burger cited to the FCC's proposed rule on cable televi-

sion, which required cable systems in major markets to dedicate at least one public access channel, to be maintained on a nondiscriminatory, first come, first serve basis, as a
possible acceptable means of access. Id But cf FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S.
689 (1979) (striking down similar regulations adopted by FCC).
50 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
51 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1982).
52 CBS, 453 U.S. at 397.
53 Id at 396-97.
54 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
55 FCC v. League of Women Voters, 52 U.S.L.W. 5008, 5011 (U.S. July 2, 1984)
(citing Tomillo).
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substance to the FCC's personal attack rules, a component of the
fairness doctrine.5 6 That statute granted political candidates the
right to reply without charge to editorial attacks printed in
newspapers.5 7
Striking down the statute as unconstitutional, the Tornillo Court,
relying on precedent, determined that any governmental interference
with the editorial content of a newspaper violates the first amendment. 51 Speaking for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Burger observed that the Court, in its earlier decisions involving the first
amendment rights of newspaper publishers, had expressed concern
over the issue of government enforced access.59 The Court maintained that those decisions rendered it unconstitutional to compel a
newspaper publisher to print that which he does not wish to
publish.6'
The Tomi/lo opinion acknowledged that the dissemination of a
broad range of views was an important public interest 6 and conceded that, because of economic reasons, the newspaper industry was
highly oligopolistic.62 Chief Justice Burger nevertheless refused to in63
voke a scarcity rationale to justify a right of access to newspapers.
56 Compare C.F.R. § 73.1920 (1983) (personal attack rules) with FLA. STAT. § 104.38
(1973). See supra note 35 for a discussion of the personal attack rules.
57 FLA. STAT. § 104.38 (1973) specifically provided:
If any newspaper in its columns assails the personal character of any candidate for nomination or for election in any election, or charges said candidate
with malfeasance or misfeasance in office, or otherwise attacks his official
record, or gives to another free space for such purpose, such newspaper shall
upon request of such candidate immediately publish free of cost any reply he
may make thereto in as conspicuous a place and in the same kind of type as
the matter that calls for such reply, provided such reply does not take up
more space than the matter replied to.
Tomillo, 418 U.S. at 244 n.2 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 104.38 (1973)).
58 Tomillo, 418 U.S. at 256.
59 Id
60 Id
61 Id.at 249-50. The Court asserted that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." Id at 252 (quoting New York Times Co.v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
62 Id at 249-50. Chief Justice Burger recognized that newspaper monopolies affect
diversity of information and shape public opinion. He observed that
[Ilocal monopoly in printed news raises serious questions. . . . What a local
newspaper does not print about local affairs does not see general print at all.
And, having the power to take initiative in reporting and enunciation of
opinions, it has extraordinary power to set the atmosphere and determine
the terms of local consideration of public issues.
Id at 250 n.15 (quoting B. BAGDIKIAN, THE INFORMATION MACHINES 127 (1971)).
63 See id at 253-54. The Court maintained that even if newspaper monopolies exist,
government-enforced access "brings about a confrontation with the express provisions of
the First Amendment." Id at 254.
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He observed that a right of reply requirement would cost the publisher time, labor, and materials as well as a loss of space in the newspaper, and he noted that expansion of newspaper editions to
compensate for a right to reply was impracticable. 64 The Chief Justice further reasoned that even in the absence of these costs, the statute would contradict the "First Amendment guarantees of a free
press."'6 5 The Court concluded that a government imposed right of
access would cause newspapers to eschew controversial issues in order
to evade the statute's operation. 6'
Although the Florida statute at issue in Torndlo was strikingly
similar to the fairness doctrine upheld in Red Lion,67 the Torni'llo opinion was devoid of any reference to that case. The Court's refusal in
Tornillo to interfere with the editorial discretion of newspaper publishers demonstrated its intent to apply different first amendment
standards to the print media than to the electronic media. While
incidental restrictions may be applied to the print media, 6 a general
"hands off" policy prevents governmental interference with the media's editorial content.6 9 In contrast, the Supreme Court has relied
upon the technological scarcity rationale, articulated in NBC and Red
Lion, to justify governmental intrusion into the editorial content of
broadcasting.70
III.

EVOLUTION OF A STANDARD:

CABLE TELEVISION

A. An Unresolved First Amendment Issue
The early role of the cable operator as merely a carrier of broad64 Id at 256-57. Chief Justice Burger maintained that adding more pages to a newspaper to print access matter was not an appropriate solution because "increasingly subscribers complain of bulky, unwieldy papers." Id. at 257 n.22 (quoting Bagdikian, Fat
Newspapers and Slim Coverage, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 19 (Sept./Oct. 1973)).
65 Id at 258.
66 Id at 257. The Court asserted that a mandatory right of access "dampens the
vigor and limits the variety of public debate." Id (quoting New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964)).
67 See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
68 See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7 (1945) (newspapers are
subject to antitrust laws); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937) (newspapers are restricted by labor laws); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250
(1936) (newspapers are subject to "ordinary forms of taxation").
69 See Bazelon, The First Amendment and the "NewMedia"--New Directions i) Regulating
Telecommunications, 31 FED. COMM. L.J. 201 (1979).
70 Following the Red Lion decision, the Supreme Court articulated two additional
rationales in order to justify government regulation of broadcasting: the "pervasive
presence" of broadcast media in American life, and the accessibility of the broadcast
media to children. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978).
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cast programming 7 ' led the Supreme Court to conclude in 1968 that
"[t]he function of CATV systems has little in common with the function of broadcasters.17 2 Cable systems, however, subsequently began
to originate their own programming and eventually surpassed broadcasters in the types of services they could offer.7" Consequently, cable
4
television has evolved into a significant medium in its own right.
Early government regulation of cable was based upon its role as
a retransmitter of broadcast signals. 75 Under the Communications
76
Act of 1934, the FCC limited its jurisdiction to common carriers
and broadcasters.77 In 1959, it determined that it could not exercise
its jurisdiction over CATV for the reason that CATV systems fell
into neither category.7" The FCC gradually abandoned this policy,
however, and asserted its jurisdiction over cable television.7 9 Its
change in policy was based upon its finding that CATV systems were
competing with broadcasters for their audience. 0 The FCC concluded that it had the authority to regulate CATV to the extent that
supra notes 2 & 3 and accompanying text.
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390, 400 (1968) (footnote
omitted).
73 See supra notes 4 & 5 and accompanying text.
74 As a result of cable's ability to augment communications services, cable television
has found its way into a significant number of American homes. Statistics indicate that
there are presently 5,000 cable systems in the United States serving approximately
14,200 communities. Those systems reach 30.2 million subscribers and are viewed by an
estimated 84 million people-37% of the nation's television households. STORER COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 4, at D-3.
75 For a succinct history of cable television, see M. HAMBURG, supra note 3, §§ 1.01.15.
76 A communications common carrier is one who "'makes a public offering to provide [communications facilities] whereby all members of the public who choose to employ such facilities may communicate or transmit intelligence of their own design and
choosing....'" FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 701 (1979) (quoting Industrial Radiolocation Service, 5 F.C.C.2d 197, 202 (1966)); see also National Ass'n of
Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 641 (D.C. Cir.) (defining prerequisites
of communications common carriers), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976).
Section 3(h) of the Communications Act of 1934, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 153(h)
(1976), provides that "a person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not ... be deemed
a common carrier." The FCC has determined that cable systems are not common carriers. Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251 (1958); see MAidwest Video II, 440
U.S. at 701 n. ll; United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 153, 169 n.29
(1968); CATV and TV Repeater Services, 26 F.C.C. 403, 427-28 (1959). For a discussion of whether cable should be given common carrier status, see Kreiss, Deregulation of
Cable Televirion and the Problem oAccess Under the FirstAmendment, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001,
71 See
72

1045-48 (1981); Rothman, Cable TVNeeds More, Not Less Regulation, Wash. Post, Mar. 15,

1981, at D1, col. 2.
77 CATV and TV Repeater Services, 26 F.C.C. 403, 427-28 (1959).
78 Id; see United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 164 (1968).
79 See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 165 (1968).
80 Id (quoting Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683, 710-11 (1965)).
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cable affected its broadcast regulatory duties."'
In the 1968 decision in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,8 2 the

Supreme Court upheld the authority of the FCC to regulate the retransmission of distant broadcast signals through cable systems. 3
The majority concluded that the challenged regulations were "reasonably ancillary" to the FCC's broadcast regulatory duties.8 4 The
Court, however, declined to express any view as to whether the FCC
had the authority to regulate cable television for any other purposes
or under any other circumstances.8 5
Shortly after the Court's decision in Southwestern Cable, the FCC
proposed rules designed to expand the functions of cable television. 6
The FCC's concern was no longer limited to the adverse effect of
cable television on broadcasting; instead, it now saw regulation of
cable as a means of furthering the public interest.8 7 In an attempt to
"requir[e] CATV affirmatively to further statutory policies,"8 8 the
FCC promulgated rules compelling cable systems with over 3,500
subscribers to originate local programming.8 9
Four years later, in United States v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest
Video I), 9° the Supreme Court upheld these mandatory program origination rules. Speaking for a four member plurality, Justice Brennan
found the FCC's regulations to be "reasonably ancillary" to its responsibility to regulate broadcasting. 9 ' The plurality asserted that
the FCC's concern with cable was "not limited to controlling the
competitive impact CATV may have on broadcast services." 9 The
Court therefore concluded that the FCC had the authority to impose
affirmative obligations on cable television in order to further the
81 Rules re Microwave-served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683, 713-15 (1965).
82

392 U.S. 157 (1968).

83 Id at 178.

a4 Id
85 Id.
86 See CATV, 15 F.C.C.2d 417 (1968) (proposing rules requiring certain cable operators to originate local programming, and proposing extension of fairness doctrine to
cable).
87 Id at 417.
88 Id at 422.
89 The rules provided that "'no CATV system having 3,500 or more subscribers shall
carry the signal of any television broadcast station unless the system also operates to a
significant extent as a local outlet by cablecasting and has available facilities for local
production and presentation of programs other than automated services.'" United
States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 653-54 (1972) (footnotes omitted) (quoting
47 C.F.R. § 74.1111 (a)).
90 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
91 Id at 663.
92

Id at 664.
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public interest.9 3 As in Southwestern Cable, the Court in Midwest Video
Iwas concerned solely with the extent of FCC jurisdiction over cable
television. Thus, it refrained from addressing the first amendment
implications of imposing mandatory program origination requirements upon cable operators.
In 1976, the FCC promulgated cable television access rules9 4
that required cable systems with over 3,500 subscribers to dedicate at
least four channels for access use, including public access, educational access, local government access, and leased access. 95 Moreover, access was to be provided by the cable operators on a
nondiscriminatory, first come, first serve basis.96 The rules specifically prohibited cable operators9 from
exercising any control over the
7
content of access programming.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit invalidated these
public access regulations in Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC (Midwest Video
1).98 Writing for the court, Chief Judge Markey determined that
the regulations impermissibly imposed common carrier responsibilities on cable operators.9 9 Concluding that the rules were not "rea93 Id. Although Chief Justice Burger concurred in the result, he asserted that the
FCC regulations at issue "strain[ed] the outer limits" of its jurisdiction. Id at 676 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist, dissented on the grounds that only Congress could decide whether cable systems
should be required to originate programming, and that therefore the FCC had exceeded
its authority in promulgating these rules. Id.at 677 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
94 See Cable TV Capacity and Access Requirements, 59 F.C.C.2d 294 (1976). Concluding that access channels would significantly advance the public interest, the FCC
stated that those channels
if properly used, [would] result in the opening of new outlets for local expression, aid in the promotion of diversity in television programming, act in
some measure to restore a sense of community to cable subscribers and a
sense of openness and participation to the video medium, aid in the functioning of democratic institutions, and improve the informational and educational communications resources of cable television communities.
Id. at 296.
95 See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 692-93 (1979) (citing 47 C.F.R.
§ 7 6.254(a) (1977)). Cable operators were permitted to combine access programming on
one or more channels until demand existed for the use of all four channels. See id at 693
(citing 47 C.F.R. § 76.254(b) (1977)).
96 See id at 694 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 76.256(d)(1), (3) (1977)).
97 See id at 693-94 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 76.256(b), (d) (1977)). Cable operators, however, have always been required to establish rules proscribing the transmission of lottery
information and obscene material. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.213 (1983) (lotteries); 47 C.F.R.
§ 76.215 (1983) (obscenity).
98 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), af'd, 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
99 Id at 1050-52. The court of appeals noted that there are two prerequisites of communications common carriers: "(1)provision of service to users indiscriminately; and
(2) transmission of intelligence of the user's own design and choosing." Id at 1050-51
(citing National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 641 (D.C.
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sonably ancillary" to the FCC's jurisdiction over television
broadcasting, the court maintained that Congressional approval was
required in order to expand the FCC's jurisdiction to include access
requirements for cable systems.' 0 0
Although discussion of the constitutionality of public access regulations was rendered unnecessary by its disposition of the case on
jurisdictional grounds, the Eighth Circuit nevertheless addressed the
first amendment issues in dicta. 1 Chief Judge Markey asserted that
in the context of public access requirements, the first amendment
rights of cable operators were analogous to those of newspaper publishers.1 0 2 The court referred to cable as a "private electronic 'publication,' "103 and reasoned that, in light of Torni'llo, °4 a cable operator
could not be compelled to provide access.' 5 In addition, the appeals
court relied upon the opinion of the District of Columbia Circuit in
Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC (HBC), °6 which also analogized the first
amendment rights of cable operators to those of the print media.'0 7
The Eighth Circuit concluded, as had the District of Columbia Circuit, that the economic scarcity'0 8 of cable systems is insufficient to
justify abridgement of a cable operator's first amendment rights.0 9
Chief Judge Markey apparently was unimpressed with the
FCC's contention that mandatory access requirements could significantly further the public interest.' ° Noting the paramount interest
Cir.), cert. denied,425 U.S. 992 (1976) and National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v.
FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608-09 (D.C. Cir. 1976)); see supra note 76.
100 Midwest Video II, 571 F.2d at 1050.
101 Id at 1052-57. The Eighth Circuit referred to Midwest Video II as "the first case
raising the First Amendment implications of a Commission effort to enforce unlimited
public access requirements." Id at 1053.
102

Id at 1056.

103 Id.

See supra notes 54-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of Tomillo.
Midwest Video II, 571 F.2d at 1055.
106 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
107 See id at 43-46.
108 Economic scarcity, in contrast to the technological scarcity of broadcast frequencies, is a characteristic of the cable industry that is derived from the industry's monopolistic development. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, Colo., 660
F.2d 1370, 1379 (10th Cir. 1981) ("natural monopoly is a constitutionally permissible
justification for some degree of regulation of cable operators"), cert.
dismissed, 102 S. Ct.
2287 (1982); HBO, 567 F.2d at 46 ("local distribution of cable signals is a natural economic monopoly").
109 Midwest Video II, 571 F.2d at 1055 (citing HBO, 567 F.2d at 46). The Eighth Circuit also cited with approval Judge Weigel's concurring opinion in HBO,in which he
expressed the view that the "Commission lacks the power to control the content of programs originating in the studios of cablecasters." Id at 1054 (quoting HBO,567 F.2d at
61 (Weigel, J., concurring)).
110 Id at 1045-46.
104
105
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of the viewer in the broadcast context, where viewers watch free of
charge, the Chief Judge maintained that this interest was no less important in the context of cable systems, where subscribers pay."' Because he found insufficient evidence to indicate that the public was,
or would be, interested in viewing access programming, however,
Chief Judge Markey was unwilling to hold that the first amendment
rights of the viewers would ultimately be served by the access
rules.

2

The Midwest Video II court distinguished the cable access rules
before it from the mandatory program origination rules upheld in
Midwest Video I "3 by observing that under the origination rules the
cable operator retained ultimate editorial control over the programs
originating from his facilities." 4 By contrast, the court reasoned, the
cable operator was unable to select either the user or the program
content under the access rules." 5 Concluding that the authority of
the FCC to infringe upon the first amendment rights of cable operators is less than its power to infringe upon the first amendment interests of broadcasters, Chief Judge Markey asserted that had it been
necessary to rule on the first amendment issue, he would have found
the FCC's access regulation unconstitutional." 6
The Supreme Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit's decision on
jurisdictional grounds," 7 holding that mandatory access rules did
not fall within the FCC's statutory authority."' Justice White, writing for the majority, conceded that the Court in CBS had perceived
that the FCC might have the flexibility to devise some kind of limited right of access in the future." 9 Nevertheless, he found that the
HI

Id at 1046.
Id
113 For a discussion of Midwest Video I, see supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
114 Midwest Video!1, 571 F.2d at 1055.
112

"15

Id.

Id at 1056. The court of appeals also indicated that serious fifth amendment concerns were generated by the access rules. It noted that the requirement of construction
of facilities for dedication to the public use may constitute a "taking" without just compensation of cablecasters' property and fees. Id at 1058. The court also expressed concern that the rules would subject cable operators to potential liability even though the
operators would be unable to control the acts of access users. Id. at 1058-59.
For a further discussion of fifth amendment questions raised by public access requirements, see Harrison, supra note 11, at 634-41. See also Berkshire Cablevision, Inc. v.
Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 988-89 (D.R.I. 1983) (discussing fifth amendment rights of
cablecasters under Rhode Island cable access regulations); nhfta note 125 (discussing fifth
amendment issue in Berkshtre Cablevision).
117 Midwest Video I, 440 U.S. at 708-09.
1a Id at 708.
'19 See id at 704-05 (citing CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Convention, 412 U.S. 94, 122,
116

131 (1973)).
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FCC's access regulations impermissibly imposed common carrier responsibilities on cable operators. 2 0 The Court, however, declined to
address the first amendment issue raised in the Eighth Circuit's opinion, except to note that "it is not frivolous.' 12 ' Thus, the question of
whether the first amendment prohibits mandatory access regulations
remains unresolved.
B. Local Mandatory Access Requzrements
The constitutionality of mandatory access requirements promulgated by a state agency was recently examined by the United States
District Court for the District of Rhode Island in Berkshire Cablevision,
Inc. v. Burke (Berkshire Cablevision).'2 2 The Rhode Island Division of
Public Utilities and Carriers (DPUC) had prescribed regulations requiring cable operators to construct an institutional/industrial net124
work

23

and to make available several channels for public access.

Berkshire Cablevision of Rhode Island, Inc., an applicant for a certif120 Id The Court did not decide whether the FCC had the statutory authority to
promulgate less intrusive access regulations, nor did it determine whether such regulations could withstand constitutional scrutiny. See id.at 705 n.14.
The dissent disagreed with the majority's view that the FCC had exceeded its jurisdiction by imposing common carrier obligations on cable operators. Id.at 709-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens found that the access rules promoted the same
statutory objectives as the mandatory origination rules upheld in Midwest Video I-"increasing the number of outlets for community self-expression and augmenting the public's choice of programs and types of services." Id.at 713-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The
dissent would not only reverse the judgment of the Eighth Circuit, but would also remand "with instructions to decide the constitutional issue." Id at 714 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
121 Id. at 709 n.19.
122 571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1983).
123 Id at 978. The purpose of the institutional/industrial network is to "permit origination and transmission, for a fee, of programming at institutions and public buildings,
including schools and religious institutions within the service territory." Id
124 Id The rules provide in relevant part:
Every CATV system operator shall make available to all of its residential
subscribers who receive all or any part of the total services offered on the
system at least one access channel in each of the categories in sub paragraphs
(1), (2), (3) herein. The remaining channels reserved for access purposes
shall be apportioned and designated in response to demonstrated community need.
Channels reserved for access purposes shall be designated as one of the
following:
(1) Public.Public access channels shall be made available for use by members of the general public on a first-come, first-served nondiscriminatory basis. The VHF spectrum shall be used for at least one of these channels;
(2) Educational: Educational access channels shall be made available for
use by local educational authorities and institutions (including, but not limited to, school departments, colleges and universities but excluding commercial educational enterprises);
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icate to operate a cable system in Newport County, challenged the
DPUC regulations as violative of the first amendment, maintaining
that the mandatory access rules deprived cable operators of editorial
control.' 2 5 It sought both a declaratory judgment that the regulations
were unconstitutional and a permanent injunction prohibiting any
26
hearings under the DPUC regulations.'
The district court denied the injunction and refused to declare
the regulations unconstitutional. 27 In his opinion, Judge Pettine disagreed with the prior rulings of the Eighth and District of Columbia
Circuits that cable operators are entitled to the same measure of first
(3) Government. Government access channels shall be made available for
use by municipal and state government;
(4) "Other": Other designations for access channels may include (but need
not be limited to) religious, cultural, ethnic heritage, and library access;
(5) Leased. Leased access channels shall be made available on a first-come,
first-served nondiscriminatory basis.
R.I. Rules, supra note 5, ch. 14, § 14.1(b). The rules further provide that access programming can be combined on one or more channels if the demand for seven public access
channels is not sufficient. Id § 14.1(e).
125 Berkshire Cablevi-ion, 571 F. Supp. at 979-80. Berkshire Cablevision challenged the
regulations on two additional grounds. The cable company contended that the rules
effected an unconstitutional taking of property in violation of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. Id at 988. Berkshire also argued that the regulation requiring cable operators to provide service to all religious institutions violated the establishment clause of the first amendment. Id at 990.
The district court held that the regulations did not constitute a taking of property
without just compensation because the rules, which were intended to further the public
good, permitted cable operators to charge a fee for the use of their facilities. The court
further found that the cable operators could use the institutional/industrial network for
their own purposes and that under the rules the cablecaster's property was not permanently, physically occupied. Judge Pettine concluded that even if it were assumed that
the regulations functioned as a taking of property, the cable operators were justly compensated because they were allowed to use public streets to construct their systems and
were given a "natural monopoly" to service a particular area with cable television. Id.at
989. See generally Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (setting forth
standards for determining when "taking" has occurred); Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (further defining those standards); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982) (holding permanent physical
occupation of property is "taking"); Harrison, supra note 11, at 634-37 (discussing "taking" issue in relation to local access regulation).
The court also rejected Berkshire's argument that the regulations violated the establishment clause. It found that the rules served a valid secular purpose and neither advanced nor inhibited religion.

Berkshire Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. at 990. See generally

Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3066 (1983) (addressing standards for determining
whether establishment clause has been violated); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263
(1981) (benefit to religion which is incidental does not violate establishment clause);
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970) (establishment clause not offended
by statute that grants tax exemption to nonprofit institutions, including religious ones).
126

Berkshire Cablevison, 571 F. Supp. at 978.

127

Id
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amendment protection as newspaper publishers. 2 8 Emphasizing the
differences between the print media and cable television, he noted
that historically cable television, unlike newspapers, has not been free
of government
control over either its program content or its
29
operations.1

Judge Pettine found that the government has a substantial interest in regulating the cable industry through a system of franchise
awards because a cable operator must use the public domain in order
to install the means of his medium. 130 For example, he observed that
a cable operator, in order to provide cable service to subscribers,
either must dig up streets to lay cable underground or string wires
across telephone poles.' 3 1 In Judge Pettine's view, government regulation of the cable industry in the form of franchise awards 1 32 not
only limits the disruptive use of public property by cable companies,133 but also shields the cable operator from competition.'
He
noted that franchising schemes take into account the high costs of
constructing a cable system 35 by awarding a franchise generally to
no more than one operator in a designated service area.13 6 Thus, the
court concluded that the franchising system creates a "natural monopoly" for the cable operator that first provides cable service in a
128 Id at 985. See generally supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text (discussing circuit court holdings).
129 Berkshire Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. at 985; accord Community Communications Co.
v. City of Boulder, Colo., 660 F.2d 1370, 1377-78 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S.
1001 (1982).
130 Berkshire Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. at 985; accord Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City
of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 127-28 (7th Cir. 1982); Community Communications Co.
v. City of Boulder, Colo., 660 F.2d 1370, 1377-78 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dsmissed, 456 U.S.
1001 (1982).
131 Berkshire Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. at 985; accord Community Communications Co.
v. City of Boulder, Colo., 660 F.2d 1370, 1377 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S.
1001 (1982).
132 Local governments award franchises in accordance with the FCC's policy of "dual
jurisdiction" over cable by Federal and local governments. Cable Television Report and
Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 207 (1972). The FCC sets the minimum standards for such
franchises. Id
133 AccordCommunity Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, Colo., 660 F.2d 1370,
1378 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismssed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982) ("A city needs control over the
number of times its citizens must bear the inconvenience of having its streets dug up and
the best times for it to occur.").
134 Berkshire Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. at 985.
135 The most expensive aspect is the distribution system, which consists of the cables
that transport the signals from the headend antennae to each subscriber. Meyerson,
supra note 14, at 4. Another costly expense is the headend equipment, which includes
construction of the tower, antenna, and processing equipment. Id at 5.
136 Berkshire Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. at 986. The cost of constructing the Newport
County cable system, for example, was estimated at seven million dollars. Id
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designated area.1 37

The Supreme Court in Tornillo rejected the existence of newspaper monopolies as a rationale for content regulation of newspapers. 3 "
On the basis of that case, the circuit courts in Midwest Video II and
HBO determined that the economic scarcity of cable systems is not a
constitutionally sufficient rationale for regulating the content of
cable television.' 39 The Berkshire Cablevision court, however, rejected
those conclusions'o and adopted the reasoning utilized in Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, Colorado,'4 ' wherein a Tenth Circuit panel maintained that Tomillo must be read in the context of
newspapers and cannot be applied wholesale to the cable medium,
42
where different circumstances are present.'
In Boulder, the local government enacted an ordinance which
placed a geographic restriction on a cable company's authority to
operate a city-wide cable system. 43 The cable company challenged
the ordinance as violative of the first amendment, arguing that
analogous restrictions on a newspaper's right to reach its audience
would be struck down. "4'

Distinguishing the newspaper and cable

industries, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that the dissimilar kind of
scarcity intrinsic to each justified different first amendment
45
treatment. 1

137 I A "natural monopoly" is a condition that arises when the demand for a particular product or service is so limited that it is possible for only one firm profitably to
produce or supply the entire demand. See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
THE LAW 139-45 (1972). Other courts and commentators agree that cable television
possesses the characteristics of a natural monopoly. See, e.g., Omega Satellite Prods. Co.
v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 127-28 (7th Cir. 1982); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, Colo., 660 F.2d 1370, 1379 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dsmssed
456 U.S. 1001 (1982); Meyerson, supra note 14, at 6-10. But see Greater Fremont, Inc. v.
City of Fremont, 302 F. Supp. 652, 657 (N.D. Ohio 1968) (cable television not a natural
monopoly), afdsub nom. Wonderland Ventures, Inc. v. City of Sandusky, 423 F.2d 548

(6th Cir. 1970); Harmon, Cable Television: A Changing Medium Raises New Legal Issue, 13
GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 123, 132-34 (1983) (same); Lee, Cable Franchising and the First
Amendment, 36 VAND. L. REV. 867, 880-87 (1983) (same).
138

Tomillo, 418 U.S. at 249-50; see supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.

139 Midwest Video II, 571 F.2d at 1055; HBO, 567 F.2d at 46; see supra text accompany-

ing notes 106-09.
140 Berkshire Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. at 986.
141 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dsmissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982).
142 Id at 1379.
143 Id at 1374. The purpose of the ordinance was to allow other cable companies to
service additional areas within Boulder. The districting plan was intended to provide
the city with a comparative basis for evaluating applications for permit renewals. The
city also believed that the plan would respit in a diversity of cable communications for
its citizens. Id
144 Id at 1375.
145 Id at 1379.
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The Tenth Circuit observed that scarcity in the newspaper industry is not a function of governmental regulation, but rather is attributable solely to economic conditions.146 On the other hand,
scarcity in the cable medium is directly related to the government
licensing scheme. 14 7 The court of appeals reasoned that the government must be permitted to deal with the consequences of scarcity
arising from the issuance of licenses.14 Stopping short of equating
the first amendment rights of cable operators with those of broadcasters, the Boulder court concluded that the creation of a natural
monopoly is a constitutionally permissible rationale for regulation of
cable television. 149
Agreeing with the Tenth Circuit's analysis, the Berkshire Cablevision court offered an additional distinction between newspapers and
cable television in support of its view that at least some content regulation of cable is permissible under the first amendment. 5 ° Judge
Pettine observed that although lack of public access to newspapers
does not preclude an individual from communicating with others in
print, lack of cable access prevents a person who does not have several million dollars to construct a cable system from expressing his
ideas through the cable medium. 1 ' This distinction led the court to
conclude that the goal of governmental regulation discussed in Red
Lion-to promote first amendment interests by making a particular
communication medium available to as many members of the general public as possible-is equally applicable in the context of cable
television. 152 Judge Pettine further maintained that the source of
scarcity is irrelevent if its effect is to shut out most potential speakers
from a powerful and important medium."'
In finding that cable television and newspapers are fundamentally different, the Berkshire Cablevision opinion reflected the long146 Id The Supreme Court in Tomillo noted the elimination of competing newspapers
in most of the large cities of the United States and attributed that phenomenon to the
dominance of newspaper chains, national newspapers, and national news and wire services. Tomillo, 418 U.S. at 249.
147 Boulder, 660 F.2d at 1379.
148 Id
149 Id The court cautioned that its conclusion "does not mean that the full panoply of
principles governing the regulation of wireless broadcasters necessarily applies to cable
operators." Id See supra note 137 for a discussion of natural monopolies.
15o Berkshire Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. at 986.
151 Id For example, any individual can express his opinion by distributing a leaflet or
pamphlet. Id
152

Id at 986-87.

Id The court observed that because of the exclusivity of the franchise system, even
those individuals who can afford to develop their own cable systems are shut out. Id at
987 n.10.
153
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standing belief of the Supreme Court that each medium of expression poses unique first amendment problems.' 54 In view of the particular characteristics of the cable medium, Judge Pettine concluded
that government regulation of cable operators' editorial control was
warranted even though such regulation would be constitutionally
impermissible if imposed to limit the editorial control of newspaper
publishers.' 55
After determining that some content regulation of cable may be
constitutionally permissible, the district court proceeded to consider
whether the DPUC rules exceeded first amendment bounds. Although regulations based upon government disapproval of speech
content are constitutionally prohibited,' 5 6 the Supreme Court, in
United States v. O'Brien,'5 7 held that a regulation which only incidentally restricts first amendment freedoms will be sustained if it "furthers an important or substantial governmental interest," and if the
incidental restriction on first amendment liberties "is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of the interest."'5 8
Because the DPUC rules dictated that public access channels be
made available to all individuals on a first come, first serve, nondiscriminatory basis,' 59 Judge Pettine held them to be content-neu154 See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 500 (1980) ("This Court
has often faced the problem of applying the broad principles of the First Amendment to
unique forums of expression."); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) ("We
have long recognized that each medium of expression presents special First Amendment
problems."); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975) ("Each
medium of expression . . . must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by standards
suited to it, for each may present its own problems."); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952) ("Each method tends to present its own peculiar problems.").
155 Berkshire Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. at 987.
156 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
157 See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980);
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
158 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. Although O'Brien involved symbolic speech in the form of
draft card burning, the test has been applied to pure speech regulations as well. See, e.g.,
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (prisoner mail censorship); Home Box Office,
Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
Regulations which restrict the time, place, and manner of expression are subjected
to a lesser standard of scrutiny by the Supreme Court. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948, 955 (1983). In order to pass constitutional muster, these regulations must be "narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication." Id; see Heffron v.
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 647, 647-48 (1981); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 477 U.S. 530, 535 (1980); Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
Neither the content nor the subject matter of speech may be used as a basis for the
restriction. ConsolidatedEdion Co., 477 U.S. at 536.
159 See supra note 124.
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tral.' 60 The court further reasoned that the rules served a substantial
governmental interest by providing access to cable television for individuals wishing to express their views and by promoting the "First
Amendment goal of producing an informed public capable of conducting its own affairs."' 16 1 In effect, the court found that the regulations facilitated the two major components of freedom of speech and
freedom of the press: the right to communicate and the right to be

informed. 162
Finally, Judge Pettine pointed out that the incidental restriction
on the cable operators' right of free expression was "no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of these governmental" interests. 6 ' He
noted that under the rules, cable operators were required to dedicate
no more than seven of their fifty or more channels for public access,
64
and thus retained complete editorial control over the remainder.
Concluding that Rhode Island's mandatory access regulations resulted in only a minimal intrusion upon the first amendment rights
of cable operators, the court held that the regulations satisfied the
criteria set by O'Brien and therefore did not violate the
65
Constitution. 1

IV. DISCUSSION
The Federal district court in Rhode Island and several commentators maintain that mandatory access rules are less intrusive in relation to first amendment interests than is the fairness doctrine. 6 6 The
fairness doctrine requires full coverage of controversial issues only
when the broadcaster takes affirmative action by airing one side of
160 Berkshire Cablevirion, 571 F. Supp. at 987. One commentator argues that access
regulations are not content neutral because cable operators must censor certain forms of
speech such as obscenity and libel. See Lee, supra note 137, at 899-908. Newspapers,

however, which are immune from content regulation, are subject to similar restrictions.
See supra note 17.
161 Berkshire Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. at 988 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969)); see also Meyerson, supra note 14, at 60-61 (access require-

ments satisfy O'Brien test).
162 See generally Emerson, The Ajinnative Side of the First Amendment, 15 GEO. L. REV.

795, 805 (1981)

(discussing "right-to-know"

as component

part of freedom of

expression).
163 Berkshire Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. at 988. The restrictions were incidental because

the mandatory access rules were not intended to limit cable operators' constitutional
freedoms. Id at 987.
164 Id at 988.
165 Id at 987-88. For a cogent discussion of when government restrictions on speech

become an abridgement of the freedom of speech, see A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL
FREEDOM 24-28 (1960).
166 See Berkshire Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. at 988; B. SCHMIDT, supra note 15, at 213;
Meyerson, supra note 14, at 50-51.
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an issue. ' 67 The doctrine appears to have a chilling effect on broadcasters, who simply avoid airing controversial issues that would trig6
ger a right to reply. 1
Public access requirements, however, are not contingent upon
the acts of cable operators. Since the operator has no editorial control over the content of access programming, the rules encourage
presentation of different views by those who utilize the access channels. The airing of controversial programs on public access channels
is separate and distinct from a cable operator's regular programming,
thus avoiding the potential chilling effect. Under cable access regulations, any individual can produce a program and maintain complete control over the production. Because access requirements
provide a forum for community members to express their views,
those rules are more likely to result in wide-open, public debate than
is the fairness doctrine. 6 9
Perceiving the inherent weakness of the fairness doctrine, the
FCC has proposed to Congress that it be eliminated. 7 ° An apparent
basis of this proposal has been the recognition by the FCC that content regulation of broadcasting unduly abridges the journalistic discretion of broadcasters because the doctrine is more likely to result in
bland programming than in presentation of controversial issues.' 7 '
Public access requirements, unlike the fairness doctrine, are contentneutral. 7 2 Because access regulations can better achieve the first
amendment objective of fostering public debate with minimal intrusion upon first amendment freedoms,' 7 3 they should be considered as
a proper replacement for the fairness doctrine.
The approach taken in Boulder and Berkshire Cablev'sion represents a significant step in resolving the question of the constitutionality of cable access requirements. Unlike the Eighth and District of
Columbia Circuits, which mechanically applied Tornillo to cable,"'
35.
Douglas, The First Amendment and the Electrontc Press, 10 U. WEST L.A. L. REV.
123, 136-37 (1978); Goldberg, supra note 19, at 587; Kaufman, Reassessing the Fairness
Doctrine, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1983 (Magazine), at 17.
169 See B. SCHMIDT, supra note 15, at 213 (comparing effects of fairness doctrine and
access channels on first amendment interests).
170 See Kaufman, supra note 168; Fowler, Freedom of (Electronic) Speech, Wash. Post,
Sept. 20, 1981, at C7, col. 2.
171 See Fowler, supra note 170.
172 See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
173 See Berkshire Cablevirion, 571 F. Supp. at 988; B. SCHMIDT, supra note 15, at 213;
Meyerson, supra note 14, at 50-51.
174 See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), a 'd, 440 U.S. 689
(1979); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829
(1977); see also supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
167 See supra note
168 See
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the Tenth Circuit and the Federal district court in Rhode Island
have recognized the need to develop
a distinct constitutional stan75
dard for the unique cable medium.

Although the Berkshire Cablevision opinion clearly distinguished
cable from newspapers,"' it failed to distinguish cable from broadcasting. Superficially, cable and broadcast television may appear the
same. There are, however, difficulties which are constitutionally relevant. First, the interests of the Federal government in regulating
the broadcast media are different from those of local governments in
regulating cable. Broadcasters are federally regulated in the public
interest because of the scarcity of frequencies.' 77 In contrast, cable
operators are regulated by local governments because of the necessary disruption of public property by cable companies. 7 8 Second, the
number of channels at the disposition of a cable operator and a
broadcaster in a given community differ. Whereas broadcasters usually operate only one channel in any market, cable operators generally operate several channels. Therefore, a cable operator can offer
more diversity with less chance of incurring economic injury than
can the broadcaster who must appeal to a large, general audience.' 7 9
Finally, cable systems provide a wide variety of functions including,
but not limited to, those provided by either newspapers or broadcasters. For example, cable operators retransmit local and distant television signals, provide informational services such as stock market,
weather, and news reports, provide nonbroadcast pay television programming, 8 ° and originate local programming from their own studios. " ' Inasmuch as cable is a distinct communications medium, it is
inappropriate to adopt either the newspaper or the broadcast
model." 2 The first amendment rights of community members would
175 See Boulder, 660 F.2d at 1379; Berkshire Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. at 986; see also supra

notes 140 & 141 and accompanying text.
176 See Berkshire Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. at 987; supra note 150 & 151 and accompanying text.
177 See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1969); NBC v.

United States, 319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943).
178

Berkshire Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. at 985; Boulder, 660 F.2d at 1377-78; see also supra

notes 130 & 131 and accompanying text.

See Meyerson, supra note 14, at 30.
180 Examples of pay television include Home Box Office, Showtime, and the Movie
179

Channel. Subscribers to these services usually pay an additional charge above the
monthly cable subscription fee.
181 See Miller & Beals, supra note 15, at 91-94 for a more detailed discussion of the
various functions of cable.
182 One commentator, in rejecting the application of either the newspaper model or
the broadcast model to cable, maintains that the correct inquiry is "whether public
access requirements abridge expression that the First Amendment was meant to protect." Meyerson, supra note 14, at 32.
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best be served by the development of a constitutional
standard which
18 3
recognizes the uniqueness of the cable medium.
The decision to require cable access is currently in the hands of
local government, but most states and municipalities have not established access regulations. 8 4 As a result, the majority of individuals
are unable to benefit from the diversity of programming available to
those in communities where access is provided. If, as suggested by
Berkshire Cablevsiion and the FCC, mandatory access rules do serve the
public interest,' 8 5 Congress should expand the FCC's jurisdiction
over cable to permit Federal access regulation. Presently, the FCC's
jurisdiction over cable, as defined in Midwest Video ,

86

does not accu-

rately reflect the status of cable as a significant communications medium in its own right. The resurrection of Federal access regulation
would allow all cable viewers to participate in the benefits of access
channels.

1"7

In the interim, the Berkshire Cablevision decision may encourage
other local governments to institute access requirements. The logical
approach of the Federal district court in Rhode Island may persuade
the Supreme Court finally to take a stand and decide that contentneutral mandatory access regulations promulgated by local governments are not violative of the first amendment.
Shirley L. Berger
183 As in the broadcasting context, the rights of cable viewers should be paramount.
See supra text accompanying note 111.
184 See Harrison, supra note 11, at 619-30.
185 See Berkshire Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. at 987-88; Cable TV Capacity and Access

Requirements, 59 F.C.C.2d 294, 296 (1976).
186 See Midwest Video , 406 U.S. at 663. The FCC's jurisdiction over cable must be
"reasonably ancillary" to its broadcast regulatory duties. Id
187 In addition to enabling individuals to express their views over cable television,
public access provides programming for particular audiences. For example, access programming may include shows for the deaf and for the elderly. Meyerson, supra note 14,
at 14.

